WAHIS, WOAH, OIE, REPORT United Kingdom Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Atypical H-Type
United Kingdom - Bovine spongiform encephalopathy - Immediate notification
GENERAL INFORMATION
COUNTRY/TERRITORY OR ZONE
COUNTRY/TERRITORY
ANIMAL TYPE
TERRESTRIAL
DISEASE CATEGORY
OIE-listed
EVENT ID
4977
DISEASE
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy
CAUSAL AGENT
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy prion, atypical strain, H-type
GENOTYPE / SEROTYPE / SUBTYPE
START DATE
2023/02/27
REASON FOR NOTIFICATION
Recurrence of an eradicated disease
DATE OF LAST OCCURRENCE
2015/09/30
CONFIRMATION DATE
2023/03/17
EVENT STATUS
On-going
END DATE
SELF-DECLARATION
NO
REPORT INFORMATION
REPORT NUMBER
Immediate notification
REPORT ID
IN_159935
REPORT REFERENCE
REPORT DATE
2023/03/20
REPORT STATUS
Validated
NO EVOLUTION REPORT
EPIDEMIOLOGY
SOURCE OF EVENT OR ORIGIN OF INFECTION
Unknown or inconclusive
EPIDEMIOLOGICAL COMMENTS
Isolated, single case of atypical H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) has been confirmed in a 17 year-old indigenous cow on a beef suckler farm. The cow was in calf and was found recumbent with no prior history of clinical signs or problems. The animal was humanely euthanized on 27/2/23, and the case was disclosed during routine national TSE statutory surveillance and testing of fallen stock cattle aged over 48 months. The animal was not presented for slaughter and did not enter the food chain. The entire carcass was disposed of as category 1 material. There is no threat to food safety or human health. Epidemiological investigations are underway. The cohort and offspring of this single atypical BSE case have been identified and placed under movement restrictions. They will be culled and the cohort screened for BSE. The detection of this single case of atypical BSE does not change the UK’s BSE disease risk status. The precise location of the farm has not been entered on the report to protect the farmer's identity and well-being
QUANTITATIVE DATA SUMMARY
MEASURING UNIT
Animal
Species Susceptible Cases Deaths Killed and Disposed ofSlaughtered/ Killed for commercial use Vaccinated
Cattle (DOMESTIC)NEW5410100TOTAL5410100
DIAGNOSTIC DETAILS
CLINICAL SIGNS
NO
METHOD OF DIAGNOSTIC
Diagnostic test
Test name Laboratory Species sampled Number of outbreaks sampled First result date Latest result date Result
Antigen detection Western blot (Ag Western blot) Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) Weybridge, United Kingdom Cattle 1 2023/03/17 2023/03/17 Positive
Antigen capture enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (AC-ELISA) Eurofins Cattle 1 2023/03/09 2023/03/09 Positive
CONTROL MEASURES AT EVENT LEVEL
CONTROL MEASURES AT EVENT LEVEL
DOMESTIC ANIMALS
WILD ANIMALS
Traceability
Applied
Official disposal of carcasses, by-products and waste
Applied
Official destruction of animal products
Applied
Selective killing and disposal
To be applied
NEW OUTBREAKS
OB_116030 - RBSE 23/0001 - CORNWALL, ENGLAND
Total BSE Cases 181,137
General statistics on BSE cases in Great Britain
Total farms 36199 n/a
Total Cases 181137 n/a
Dairy Farms 22423 61.94
Suckler Farms 10240 28.29
Mixed Farms 2136 5.90
Not Recorded 1400 3.87
Dairy Cases 146123 80.67
Suckler cases 22015 12.15
Mixed Cases 10637 5.87
Not Recorded 2362 1.30
Purchased Cases 59155 32.66
Homebred Cases 120744 66.66
Not Recorded 1238 0.68 Confirmed dairy herd incidence 62.1%
Confirmed suckler herd incidence 17.8%
Confirmed total herd incidence 38.7%
Youngest confirmed case 20 Months
Oldest confirmed case 22 Years Data valid to 30 November 2022*
*These figures will only be updated when new data is reported
Overview of BSE Cases in Great Britain
Age and related statistics
BSE cases born after the reinforced feed ban (BARB) in the UK
Details These documents provide statistics on the number of cases of TSE disease found through the active and passive disease surveillance of cattle in the United Kingdom.
Cases of TSE disease identified in cattle from passive surveillance in United Kingdom have been recorded since 1986. The UK carried out limited active surveillance in cattle from 1999 to 2001. The European Union active surveillance programme started in July 2001.
The UK carries out active disease surveillance for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in cattle. The testing programme includes cattle over 48 months of age which:
die or are killed other than for human consumption (fallen cattle) are emergency slaughtered or show certain abnormalities at ante-mortem inspection These age thresholds apply to cattle born in the United Kingdom or in other EU member states except Bulgaria and Romania. For cattle born elsewhere the age thresholds are 24 months for fallen cattle or emergency slaughtered cattle, and 30 months for healthy fallen cattle.
Passive disease surveillance takes place when an animal with clinical signs suspicious of a TSE disease is reported to Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA), and further investigation determines whether the animal was affected by BSE or scrapie.
Published 11 February 2015 Last updated 9 December 2022 - hide all updates 9 December 2022 Updated the following TSE statistics documents: Overview of Great Britain statistics, general statistics, age and related statistics, list of BSE cases born after the reinforced feed ban (BARB).
16 November 2022 Updated the following TSE statistics documents: general statistics, age and related statistics and the lists of BARB cases.
16 November 2022 Updated the overview of Great Britain statistics document.
20 September 2022 Updated the following TSE statistics documents: overview of Great Britain statistics, general statistics, age and related statistics, list of BARB cases.
16 February 2022 Updated the following TSE statistics documents: Overview of Great Britain statistics, general statistics, age and related statistics, list of BARB cases.
22 October 2021 Updated the documents to include the latest data.
23 March 2021 Attachments updated to include February 2021 data.
21 January 2021 Updated the overview and general statistics documents.
21 December 2020 Stats available for November 2020.
20 November 2020 Updated the cattle TSE surveillance statistics: overview of GB, age and related and general.
14 October 2020 Updated the TSE cattle barb cases statistics.
19 August 2020 Updated the cattle TSE surveillance statistics: overview of GB and general.
17 October 2019 Updated cattle TSE surveillance statistics reports for September 2019
11 September 2019 Published cattle TSE stats for August 2019
20 August 2019 Replacement documents with July statistics uploaded.
16 July 2019 Stats available for June
14 June 2019 May 2019 statistics available
14 May 2019 Statistics updated
15 April 2019 Statistics updated
7 March 2019 Statistics available for February 2019
14 February 2019 Documents updated
17 January 2019 Documents updated
11 December 2018 Documents updated
14 November 2018 Documents updated
13 November 2018 List of BARB cases updated
8 October 2018 Documents updated
10 September 2018 Documents updated
15 August 2018 Documents updated
10 July 2018 Cattle documents updated
11 June 2018 Cattle documents updated
9 May 2018 Documents updated
18 April 2018 Documents updated
8 March 2018 Cattle documents updated
28 February 2018 Removed 'cattle over 72 months which are healthy and slaughtered for human consumption' bullet under testing programme includes section.
6 February 2018 Documents updated
11 January 2018 Updated documents
12 December 2017 Updated documents
9 November 2017 Documents updated
20 October 2017 Updated cattle documents
7 September 2017 Updated cattle documents
3 August 2017 Updated documents
6 July 2017 Cattle documents updated
13 June 2017 Updated cattle documents
10 May 2017 Cattle age and Overview of Great Britain documents updated
7 April 2017 Updated cattle documents
8 March 2017 List of BARB cases updated
8 March 2017 Updated cattle documents
8 February 2017 Documents updated
11 January 2017 Documents updated
9 December 2016 Documents updated
10 November 2016 Cattle documents updated
27 October 2016 Cattle age document updated
7 October 2016 List of BARB cases document updated
7 October 2016 Cattle documents updated
13 September 2016 Cattle documents updated
12 August 2016 Cattle documents updated
7 July 2016 Documents updated
10 May 2016 Cattle documents updated
11 April 2016 Cattle documents updated
14 March 2016 Cattle documents updated
10 February 2016 Cattle documents updated
12 January 2016 Documents updated
8 December 2015 Cattle documents updated for November 2015
9 November 2015 Updated documents for October 2015.
6 October 2015 Updated statistics for September 2015
10 September 2015 Documents updated for August 2015
9 June 2015 Documents updated for May 2015
11 February 2015 First published.
1 October 2014
AHVLA documents have been re-assigned to the new Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA).
ODD to me, all these mad cow cases showing up about the same time???
WAHIS, WOAH, OIE, REPORT Switzerland Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Atypical L-Type 2023/03/08
Switzerland Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Atypical L-Type
Switzerland - Bovine spongiform encephalopathy - Immediate notification
BRAZIL BSE START DATE 2023/01/18
BRAZIL BSE CONFIRMATION DATE 2023/02/22
BRAZIL BSE END DATE 2023/03/03
SPAIN BSE START DATE 2023/01/21
SPAIN BSE CONFIRMATION DATE 2023/02/03
SPAIN BSE END DATE 2023/02/06
NETHERLANDS BSE START DATE 2023/02/01
NETHERLANDS BSE CONFIRMATION DATE 2023/02/01
NETHERLANDS BSE END DATE 2023/03/13
NOW before you go off and start repeating BSE TSE Prion science that is almost 50 years old, let's be perfectly clear what science is saying today, and especially what the WAHIS/WOAH/OIE et al are saying about the atypical BSE strains...
OIE Conclusions on transmissibility of atypical BSE among cattle
Given that cattle have been successfully infected by the oral route, at least for L-BSE, it is reasonable to conclude that atypical BSE is potentially capable of being recycled in a cattle population if cattle are exposed to contaminated feed. In addition, based on reports of atypical BSE from several countries that have not had C-BSE, it appears likely that atypical BSE would arise as a spontaneous disease in any country, albeit at a very low incidence in old cattle. In the presence of livestock industry practices that would allow it to be recycled in the cattle feed chain, it is likely that some level of exposure and transmission may occur. As a result, since atypical BSE can be reasonably considered to pose a potential background level of risk for any country with cattle, the recycling of both classical and atypical strains in the cattle and broader ruminant populations should be avoided.
Annex 7 (contd) AHG on BSE risk assessment and surveillance/March 2019
34 Scientific Commission/September 2019
3. Atypical BSE
The Group discussed and endorsed with minor revisions an overview of relevant literature on the risk of atypical BSE being recycled in a cattle population and its zoonotic potential that had been prepared ahead of the meeting by one expert from the Group. This overview is provided as Appendix IV and its main conclusions are outlined below. With regard to the risk of recycling of atypical BSE, recently published research confirmed that the L-type BSE prion (a type of atypical BSE prion) may be orally transmitted to calves1 . In light of this evidence, and the likelihood that atypical BSE could arise as a spontaneous disease in any country, albeit at a very low incidence, the Group was of the opinion that it would be reasonable to conclude that atypical BSE is potentially capable of being recycled in a cattle population if cattle were to be exposed to contaminated feed. Therefore, the recycling of atypical strains in cattle and broader ruminant populations should be avoided.
The Group acknowledged the challenges in demonstrating the zoonotic transmission of atypical strains of BSE in natural exposure scenarios. Overall, the Group was of the opinion that, at this stage, it would be premature to reach a conclusion other than that atypical BSE poses a potential zoonotic risk that may be different between atypical strains.
4. Definitions of meat-and-bone meal (MBM) and greaves
snip...
REFERENCES
SNIP...END SEE FULL TEXT;
''H-TYPE BSE AGENT IS TRANSMISSIBLE BY THE ORONASAL ROUTE''
This study demonstrates that the H-type BSE agent is transmissible by the oronasal route. These results reinforce the need for ongoing surveillance for classical and atypical BSE to minimize the risk of potentially infectious tissues entering the animal or human food chains.
Consumption of L-BSE–contaminated feed may pose a risk for oral transmission of the disease agent to cattle.
Thus, it is imperative to maintain measures that prevent the entry of tissues from cattle possibly infected with the agent of L-BSE into the food chain.
IT is imperative that the USA puts forth immediately a MANDATORY National Animal Identification System and Country Of Origin Labeling System, for the sake of livestock industry and the consumers that consume their products...terry
We recently observed the direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to macaque after a 10-year silent incubation period, with features similar to some reported for human cases of sporadic CJD, albeit requiring fourfold longe incubation than BSE. Scrapie, as recently evoked in humanized mice (Cassard, 2014), is the third potentially zoonotic PD (with BSE and L-type BSE), thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases. We will present an updated panorama of our different transmission studies and discuss the implications of such extended incubation periods on risk assessment of animal PD for human health.
2.3.2. New evidence on the zoonotic potential of atypical BSE and atypical scrapie prion strains
Olivier Andreoletti, INRA Research Director, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA) – École Nationale Vétérinaire de Toulouse (ENVT), invited speaker, presented the results of two recently published scientific articles of interest, of which he is co-author:
‘Radical Change in Zoonotic Abilities of Atypical BSE Prion Strains as Evidenced by Crossing of Sheep Species Barrier in Transgenic Mice’ (MarinMoreno et al., 2020) and ‘The emergence of classical BSE from atypical/Nor98 scrapie’ (Huor et al., 2019).
In the first experimental study, H-type and L-type BSE were inoculated into transgenic mice expressing all three genotypes of the human PRNP at codon 129 and into adapted into ARQ and VRQ transgenic sheep mice. The results showed the alterations of the capacities to cross the human barrier species (mouse model) and emergence of sporadic CJD agents in Hu PrP expressing mice: type 2 sCJD in homozygous TgVal129 VRQ-passaged L-BSE, and type 1 sCJD in homozygous TgVal 129 and TgMet129 VRQ-passaged H-BSE.
This study demonstrates that the H-type BSE agent is transmissible by the oronasal route. These results reinforce the need for ongoing surveillance for classical and atypical BSE to minimize the risk of potentially infectious tissues entering the animal or human food chains.
***Moreover, sporadic disease has never been observed in breeding colonies or primate research laboratories, most notably among hundreds of animals over several decades of study at the National Institutes of Health25, and in nearly twenty older animals continuously housed in our own facility.***
Even if the prevailing view is that sporadic CJD is due to the spontaneous formation of CJD prions, it remains possible that its apparent sporadic nature may, at least in part, result from our limited capacity to identify an environmental origin.
O.05: Transmission of prions to primates after extended silent incubation periods: Implications for BSE and scrapie risk assessment in human populations
Emmanuel Comoy, Jacqueline Mikol, Valerie Durand, Sophie Luccantoni, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra, Capucine Dehen, and Jean-Philippe Deslys Atomic Energy Commission; Fontenay-aux-Roses, France
Prion diseases (PD) are the unique neurodegenerative proteinopathies reputed to be transmissible under field conditions since decades. The transmission of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) to humans evidenced that an animal PD might be zoonotic under appropriate conditions. Contrarily, in the absence of obvious (epidemiological or experimental) elements supporting a transmission or genetic predispositions, PD, like the other proteinopathies, are reputed to occur spontaneously (atpical animal prion strains, sporadic CJD summing 80% of human prion cases).
Non-human primate models provided the first evidences supporting the transmissibiity of human prion strains and the zoonotic potential of BSE. Among them, cynomolgus macaques brought major information for BSE risk assessment for human health (Chen, 2014), according to their phylogenetic proximity to humans and extended lifetime. We used this model to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal PD from bovine, ovine and cervid origins even after very long silent incubation periods.
*** We recently observed the direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to macaque after a 10-year silent incubation period,
***with features similar to some reported for human cases of sporadic CJD, albeit requiring fourfold long incubation than BSE. Scrapie, as recently evoked in humanized mice (Cassard, 2014),
***is the third potentially zoonotic PD (with BSE and L-type BSE),
***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases.
We will present an updated panorama of our different transmission studies and discuss the implications of such extended incubation periods on risk assessment of animal PD for human health.
===============
***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases***
===============
***our findings suggest that possible transmission risk of H-type BSE to sheep and human. Bioassay will be required to determine whether the PMCA products are infectious to these animals.
==============
PRION 2015 CONFERENCE
***Transmission data also revealed that several scrapie prions propagate in HuPrP-Tg mice with efficiency comparable to that of cattle BSE. While the efficiency of transmission at primary passage was low, subsequent passages resulted in a highly virulent prion disease in both Met129 and Val129 mice.
***Transmission of the different scrapie isolates in these mice leads to the emergence of prion strain phenotypes that showed similar characteristics to those displayed by MM1 or VV2 sCJD prion.
***These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions.
PRION 2016 TOKYO
Saturday, April 23, 2016
SCRAPIE WS-01: Prion diseases in animals and zoonotic potential 2016
Prion. 10:S15-S21. 2016 ISSN: 1933-6896 printl 1933-690X online
Taylor & Francis
Prion 2016 Animal Prion Disease Workshop Abstracts
WS-01: Prion diseases in animals and zoonotic potential
Transmission of the different scrapie isolates in these mice leads to the emergence of prion strain phenotypes that showed similar characteristics to those displayed by MM1 or VV2 sCJD prion.
These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions.
Title: Transmission of scrapie prions to primate after an extended silent incubation period)
*** In complement to the recent demonstration that humanized mice are susceptible to scrapie, we report here the first observation of direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to a macaque after a 10-year incubation period. Neuropathologic examination revealed all of the features of a prion disease: spongiform change, neuronal loss, and accumulation of PrPres throughout the CNS.
*** This observation strengthens the questioning of the harmlessness of scrapie to humans, at a time when protective measures for human and animal health are being dismantled and reduced as c-BSE is considered controlled and being eradicated.
*** Our results underscore the importance of precautionary and protective measures and the necessity for long-term experimental transmission studies to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal prion strains.
SO, WHO'S UP FOR SOME MORE TSE PRION POKER, WHO'S ALL IN $$$
SO, ATYPICAL SCRAPIE ROUGHLY HAS 50 50 CHANCE ATYPICAL SCRAPIE IS CONTAGIOUS, AS NON-CONTAGIOUS, TAKE YOUR PICK, BUT I SAID IT LONG AGO WHEN USDA OIE ET AL MADE ATYPICAL SCRAPIE A LEGAL TRADING COMMODITY, I SAID YOUR PUTTING THE CART BEFORE THE HORSE, AND THAT'S EXACTLY WHAT THEY DID, and it's called in Texas, TEXAS TSE PRION HOLDEM POKER, WHO'S ALL IN $$$
***> AS is considered more likely (subjective probability range 50–66%) that AS is a non-contagious, rather than a contagious, disease.
SNIP...SEE;
THURSDAY, JULY 8, 2021
EFSA Scientific report on the analysis of the 2‐year compulsory intensified monitoring of atypical scrapie
SUNDAY, MARCH 19, 2023
Abandoned factory ‘undoubtedly’ contains dormant Mad Cow Disease that could threaten humans, Thruxted Mill, Queniborough CJD
Abandoned factory ‘undoubtedly’ contains dormant Mad Cow Disease that could threaten humans
Thruxted Mill was one of five UK sites where Mad Cow infected cattle were destroyed. Now, a University of Kent professor warns human activity must never be encouraged there
Pol Allingham SWNS
An abandoned factory “undoubtedly” contains dormant and dangerous Mad Cow Disease that could threaten humans, scientists have warned.
Thruxted Mill was one of five UK sites where Mad Cow infected cattle were destroyed.
Scientists warned against housing developments on the land, in a paper claiming the derelict seven-acre Kent complex may still be a safety threat today.
The “dreadful” horror movie-like setting has remained untouched for around 16 years, but that has not deterred prospective residential contractors from trying to build 20 homes there.
Professor Alan Colchester, University of Kent, said human activity must never be encouraged near the mill and surrounding woodlands.
The consultant neurologist believes the plant remains a threat because the molecules that cause Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) are extremely difficult to destroy and can incubate for several years.
Recommended ‘Grief is a strange thing to bond over’: Jon Pointing on Big Boys, British comedy and breaking stereotypes ‘Grief is a strange thing to bond over’: Jon Pointing on Big Boys, British comedy and breaking stereotypes Unusually high cancer rates found in military pilots and ground crews Unusually high cancer rates found in military pilots and ground crews ‘My daughter refused to eat solids – so I took matters into my own hands’ ‘My daughter refused to eat solids – so I took matters into my own hands’ The former animal-rendering plant, where animal waste is turned into usable materials, sits in an Area of Outstanding Beauty between Ashford and Canterbury.
A user of urban exploring forum ‘28DaysLater.co.uk’ - named after the zombie film - claimed they visited the “wide open” site in May last year.
RXQueen said: “I’ve smelled/smelt some bad things in my times exploring but nothing, absolutely nothing, will beat this place. It was a mix of blood, rust, decay, oil, pigeon shit and death.”
The blogger reported finding animal bones beneath the old grinders.
During the 1990s and noughties, truckloads of animal remains were ferried to the site where machines split fat and protein residue from the bone.
Piles of carcasses were reportedly dumped in the yard area repeatedly, leaving a foul smell hanging over the countryside.
Chunks of dead cattle were often littered across surrounding roads.
(KMG / SWNS) A lost lorry heading to the mill spilled tongues and lumps of a bladder the size of a football on a village residential street nearby.
At the time, villager Peter Hancox said: “I have lived here for about six years and we have frequently had fluid spillages, but this was one lump of guts too far. The smell was horrible.”
Nonetheless, in 2017 developers hoped to decontaminate the site and build 20 homes with an estimated cost of £1.75 million.
Professor Colchester said: “The site is a biohazard.
“It’s always been known that the infected agents for Mad Cow Disease are incredibly resistant to normal decay and destruction and there will undoubtedly be some long-term contamination in the soil.
“The point is that there are various ways you could come into contact with it.
“The worst-case scenario is that you could transmit the illness to animals or humans from environmental materials that have themselves been infected in the past.
(KMG / SWNS) “And with CJD, we’re talking about a seriously long incubation period - from a few months to several years.
“Infected remains were left lying around and contaminated material is probably still lying in large quantities in the soil.
“Nothing should be done to encourage human activity around Thruxted Mill or the surrounding woodlands.
“If you have places in an urban environment that has contamination, then there might be a case that we should tarmac it over completely.”
Passed onto humans, the disease caused memory loss, personality changes, abnormal jerking movements, loss of brain function, and loss of mobility.
Pitching the 2017 housing scheme, developers stressed soil studies showed evidence of matter including asbestos, metals, petroleum, oils and fats. But no microbiological species such as anthrax or salmonella were found.
Ashford Borough Council gave the 2017 housing scheme the green light, admitting the site “had the most dreadful legacy.”
But plans were scrapped following a legal battle launched by disgruntled resident Camillia Swire, on the grounds they lacked expert evidence.
Ms Swire’s daughter Eleanor worked on the recent study with Professor Colchester on his paper “Out of sight, out of mind? BSE 30 years on.”
Thruxted Mill is thought to have been originally developed as a saw mill in the 1960s and transformed into the animal-rendering plant by Canterbury Mills Ltd.
Documents on Companies House show the firm was dissolved in 2010, two years after the factory was closed.
A spokesman for the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs said: “To prevent risks of spreading disease from residues in the soil, groundwater or air pollution, the burial or burning of fallen stock, including all farmed animals, in the open has been banned since 2003.
Knacker's yard link to Queniborough nvCJD cluster
Sun, 13 Aug 2000
Jonathan Leake and Dipesh Gadher Sunday Times Additional reporting: Graham Hind BRITAIN'S worst outbreak of the human form of mad-cow disease may be linked to a nearby knacker's yard that sold meat from diseased animals. The yard operated just eight miles from Queniborough, the Leicestershire village where health officials are investigating the first known cluster of CJD cases. Three people who spent time in the village died from CJD in 1998, and a fourth person is suspected of having the degenerative brain disease. Another victim lived just three miles away.
The possible link to the knacker's yard - which recycled animals unfit for human consumption into pet food and other products - dates back 20 years, to about the time when scientists now believe the BSE epidemic may have begun.
Two meat traders from Bedfordshire were convicted in 1982 of buying unapproved beef from W E Mason & Sons of Wigston, near Leicester, and selling it to an unsuspecting butcher in Hertfordshire.
Last week officials seized council documents and court reports relating to the company to determine whether any unfit meat may have entered the human food chain locally.
"We have had a very useful series of conversations about this with Oadby and Wigston council," said Philip Monk, a consultant in communicable disease control at Leicestershire health authority, who is heading the Queniborough investigation. "I am ruling nothing in and nothing out. Anything we have that is potentially helpful in explaining local meat trading practices has to be examined."
The case heard by Leicester magistrates in 1982 was the culmination of Operation Meat Hook, a joint investigation between detectives and environmental health officers from three counties.
The teams covertly observed Peter Fletcher, a partner in a wholesale butcher's business near Dunstable, on four occasions in 1980 when he visited Leonard Mason, the yard's owner. He loaded beef carcasses from the yard into an un-marked van, which had been contaminated by a cow's head "fouled by stomach contents", according to evidence given in court. One of the carcasses was later found to have been infected with pleurisy.
Fletcher marked the meat with a fake inspector's stamp, and then left it with a retail butcher near Hemel Hempstead, Hertfordshire.
"A knacker's yard may, and frequently will, deal with diseased cattle," the prosecutor had told an earlier hearing. "Meat may be partly decomposed and contaminated. Disease is rife in such premises and could include anthrax and tuberculosis."
Fletcher was jailed for three months and fined £500. His partner, Francis Fensome, received a suspended prison sentence. Mason was cleared after telling the court that he had been told the meat was to be used to feed animals at Whipsnade zoo [site of two cheetah BSE fatalities -- webmaster]
The knacker's yard, which had been run by the Mason family since 1947, was closed the same year and now stands derelict. Mason has since died.
Last week his brother, Jack Mason, said: "I am confident there is no connection with us and the outbreak in Queniborough. Most of the meat went to zoos. Any meat that was sold locally went to dog owners as pet food."
There is no proof that Mason dealt in cattle infected with BSE, which was not recognised at the time. But such yards commonly dealt in "downer" cows - those displaying symptoms of illness - so any animals that did have BSE were likely to have ended up in such places.
The Queniborough inquiry team is also examining slaughtering techniques at Leicestershire abattoirs and childhood eating habits of those who grew up in the village, although school meals have been ruled out as a possible cause of the CJD outbreak.
Arthur Beyless lost his daughter, Pamela, 24, a bank worker, to the disease after a two-year struggle for survival. Although the Beylesses live in nearby Glenfield, Pamela regularly visited her grandparents in Queniborough and the family often bought meat from Ian Bramley, the village butcher, in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Beyless said: "On one occasion I was buying some meat when Ian told me he'd got it for 'a good deal'. It does make you wonder when you consider this theory about the knacker's yard. This disease is something that might never have happened if people weren't always grasping for that last penny."
The other two named victims with links to Queniborough are Stacey Robinson, 19, who lived there for 12 years before moving to another part of the county, and Glen Day, 34, who worked on a farm in the area. He regularly ate at the Horse and Groom pub, which was supplied with meat by Bramley.
Bramley died in a car crash. His stepmother, Hazel Bramley, said she knew nothing about Mason's yard. "We bought our meat directly from local farmers," she said. "The animals were slaughtered in Leicester and delivered to us. I don't know anything about this place in Wigston."
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy: Epidemiological studies
The Veterinary Record, December 17, 1988 J.W. Wilesmith, G.A.H.Wells, M.P. Cranwell, J.B.M. Ryan
"There was no clear or single explanation why, in 1982, cattle apparently became first exposed to a transmissible agent sufficiently to result in clinical disease. A number of factors have been identified which when combined are undoubtedly significant in the occurrence of this epidemiological phenomenon. These include; a dramatic increase in the sheep population in Great Britain which commenced in 1980 and has continued (MAFF 1988); a probable increase in the presence of scrapie infected flocks (J.W. Wilesmith unpublished data); the greater inclusion of sheep heads in material for rendering; the greater inclusion of casualty and condemned sheep in material for rendering as a result of the reduction in the number of knackers' yards; the introduction of continuous rendering processes during the 1970's and 1980's which may have resulted in the rendering of animal material at a lower temperature and, or, a shorter time than previously and the decline in the practice of using hydrocarbon solvents and terminal heat treatment for fat extraction since the mid 1970s (MMC 1985)...."
Tue, 8, Aug 2000 19:39:27 -0400
From: jonathan leake
Date: Tue, 8, Aug 2000 19:39:27 -0400
Subject: IN CONFIDENCE (I SMELL A STORY ......)
Sender: jonathan leake
To: BSE Terry Singletary
Hi Terry - this is Jonathan Leake here. we're thinking of doing a story on the knackers yard meat issue - is there a link to Queniborough? Would you mind resending any info you have on this - I may have lost some of the stuff you sent.
Cd you send it to jonathan.leake@suandy-times.co.uk
AND
HE'S RESEARCHING THIS STORY FOR ME AS I'M AT A CONFERENCEMANY THANKS FOR YOUR HELP - AND FOR ALL THE GOOD WORK YOU'VE BEEN DOING
snip...end...TSS
=====
Re: IN CONFIDENCE (I SMELL A STORY )
Subject: Re: IN CONFIDENCE (I SMELL A STORY )
Date: Tue, 08 Aug 2000 21:41:57 -0700
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To: jonathan leake
Hello Jonathan, yes, give me some time though. there is a shitstorm on CJD Voice, they let the Faillace's on the CJD Voice support group (TSE tainted sheep farmers)without telling anyone; and myself and other are pissed off to say the least. This was suppose to be a support group. i told them it would be like asking the Malboro Man on a Cancer List. But he is Dead. Maybe it struck a nerve. Have you got the DFA 4, 5, and 7, i thought i read something about knackers or maybe baby foods??? not sure. i can send to you. I am sure i havesomething in the GBR's for the states and the other countries,
don't have time to read. you can read them at;
don't have time to read. you can read them at;
i will search as soon as i get time ....
kind regards, Terry
jonathan leake wrote: Hi Terry - this is Jonathan Leake here. we're thinking of doing a story on the knackers yard meat issue - is there a link to Queniborough? Would you mind resending any info you have on this - I may have lost some of the stuff you sent.
snip...END...TSS
Re: KNACKERS AND RENDERS
Subject: Re: KNACKERS AND RENDERS
Date: Thu, 10 Aug 2000 16:04:14 ·0700
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To: jonathan.leake@sunday-times.co.uk, dipesh.gadher@Sunday-times.co.ukdo you have access to the; The Veterinary-Record, December 20/27, 1997 Papers and Articles Effect of rendering procedures on the scrapie agent D. M. Taylor, S.L. Woodgate, A.J.Fleetwood, R.J.G. Cawthorne it's about 6 or 7 pages. i do not have its canned and it's fairly fine print, however good print.
also the report; The Veterinary Record, March 2, 1991 Papers and Articles Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy: epidemiological studies on the origin there is a good section of rendering; Survey of rendering processes, solvents etc (very detailed on temps and processes) can scan copy correct and paste, but it will take some time, or fax COLLECT to you. I'm running out of quarters fast, nobody paying me to do this, and i am on disablility. so the fax will have to be collect ... regards, Terry
1 of 1 8/13/00 1 :06 PM
end...TSS
Date: Fri, 2 Mar 2001 23:27:10 +0000 (GMT)From:
Subject: confidential
To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
"Okay, you need to know. You don't need to pass it on as nothing will come of it and there is not a damned thing anyone can do about it. Don't even hint at it as it will be denied and laughed at..........
USDA is gonna do as little as possible until there is actually a human casein the USA of the nvcjd........
if you want to move this thing along and shake the earth....
then we gotta get the victims families to make sure whoever is doing the
autopsy is credible, trustworthy, and a saint with the courage of Joan of Arc........
I am not kidding!!!! so, unless we get a human death from EXACTLY the same form with EXACTLY the same histopath lesions as seen in the UK nvcjd........
forget any action........
it is ALL gonna be sporadic!!!And, if there is a case.......
there is gonna be every effort to link it to international travel, international food, etc. etc. etc. etc. etc. They willgo so far as to find out if a sex partner had ever traveled to the UK/europe, etc. etc. ....
It is gonna be a long, lonely, dangerous twisted journey to the truth. They have all the cards, all the money, and are willing to threaten and carry out those threats....
and this may be their biggest
downfall.
downfall.
=====
snip...
new url;
new url;
http://web.archive.org/web/20090505234749/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1976/10/12004001.pdf
new url;
http://web.archive.org/web/20090505234344/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1988/10/00001001.pdf
new url;
new url;
snip...
for anyone interested, see full text ;
Thursday, July 08, 2010
GLOBAL CLUSTERS OF CREUTZFELDT JAKOB DISEASE - A REVIEW 2010
----- Original Message -----
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
To: CJD-L@LISTS.AEGEE.ORG
Sent: Thursday, July 08, 2010 9:27 PM
Subject: GLOBAL CLUSTERS OF CREUTZFELDT JAKOB DISEASE - A REVIEW
2010
2010
kind regards,terry
if I forget and you don't here from me, write back.....later/// Happy Thanksgiving to you and yours...kindest regards, terry
Science and environment writer Jonathan Leake of the Sunday Times in London said Singeltary has helped him track down families of people with CJD along with academic research papers.
"I strongly suspect he is right in thinking the USA has had BSE cases," Leake said by e-mail.
"The American government is making the same mistake as the British in putting the short-term commercial interests of its farmers before health considerations," he added.
"It should start formal and widespread testing of cattle plus compulsory autopsies for all human CJD victims at the state's expense. If there is BSE, then leaving it to spread will kill people -- and that would eventually destroy the industry, too."
Knacker's yard link to Queniborough nvCJD cluster
Sun, 13 Aug 2000 Jonathan Leake and Dipesh Gadher
Sunday Times Additional reporting: Graham Hind
BRITAIN'S worst outbreak of the human form of mad-cow disease may be linked to a nearby knacker's yard that sold meat from diseased animals. The yard operated just eight miles from Queniborough, the Leicestershire village where health officials are investigating the first known cluster of CJD cases.
Three people who spent time in the village died from CJD in 1998, and a fourth person is suspected of having the degenerative brain disease. Another victim lived just three miles away.
The possible link to the knacker's yard - which recycled animals unfit for human consumption into pet food and other products - dates back 20 years, to about the time when scientists now believe the BSE epidemic may have begun.
Two meat traders from Bedfordshire were convicted in 1982 of buying unapproved beef from W E Mason & Sons of Wigston, near Leicester, and selling it to an unsuspecting butcher in Hertfordshire.
Last week officials seized council documents and court reports relating to the company to determine whether any unfit meat may have entered the human food chain locally.
"We have had a very useful series of conversations about this with Oadby and Wigston council," said Philip Monk, a consultant in communicable disease control at Leicestershire health authority, who is heading the Queniborough investigation. "I am ruling nothing in and nothing out. Anything we have that is potentially helpful in explaining local meat trading practices has to be examined."
The case heard by Leicester magistrates in 1982 was the culmination of Operation Meat Hook, a joint investigation between detectives and environmental health officers from three counties.
The teams covertly observed Peter Fletcher, a partner in a wholesale butcher's business near Dunstable, on four occasions in 1980 when he visited Leonard Mason, the yard's owner. He loaded beef carcasses from the yard into an un-marked van, which had been contaminated by a cow's head "fouled by stomach contents", according to evidence given in court. One of the carcasses was later found to have been infected with pleurisy.
Fletcher marked the meat with a fake inspector's stamp, and then left it with a retail butcher near Hemel Hempstead, Hertfordshire.
"A knacker's yard may, and frequently will, deal with diseased cattle," the prosecutor had told an earlier hearing. "Meat may be partly decomposed and contaminated. Disease is rife in such premises and could include anthrax and tuberculosis."
Fletcher was jailed for three months and fined ?500. His partner, Francis Fensome, received a suspended prison sentence. Mason was cleared after telling the court that he had been told the meat was to be used to feed animals at Whipsnade zoo [site of two cheetah BSE fatalities -- webmaster]
The knacker's yard, which had been run by the Mason family since 1947, was closed the same year and now stands derelict. Mason has since died.
Last week his brother, Jack Mason, said: "I am confident there is no connection with us and the outbreak in Queniborough. Most of the meat went to zoos. Any meat that was sold locally went to dog owners as pet food."
There is no proof that Mason dealt in cattle infected with BSE, which was not recognised at the time. But such yards commonly dealt in "downer" cows - those displaying symptoms of illness - so any animals that did have BSE were likely to have ended up in such places.
The Queniborough inquiry team is also examining slaughtering techniques at Leicestershire abattoirs and childhood eating habits of those who grew up in the village, although school meals have been ruled out as a possible cause of the CJD outbreak.
Arthur Beyless lost his daughter, Pamela, 24, a bank worker, to the disease after a two-year struggle for survival. Although the Beylesses live in nearby Glenfield, Pamela regularly visited her grandparents in Queniborough and the family often bought meat from Ian Bramley, the village butcher, in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Beyless said: "On one occasion I was buying some meat when Ian told me he'd got it for 'a good deal'. It does make you wonder when you consider this theory about the knacker's yard. This disease is something that might never have happened if people weren't always grasping for that last penny."
The other two named victims with links to Queniborough are Stacey Robinson, 19, who lived there for 12 years before moving to another part of the county, and Glen Day, 34, who worked on a farm in the area. He regularly ate at the Horse and Groom pub, which was supplied with meat by Bramley.
Bramley died in a car crash. His stepmother, Hazel Bramley, said she knew nothing about Mason's yard. "We bought our meat directly from local farmers," she said. "The animals were slaughtered in Leicester and delivered to us. I don't know anything about this place in Wigston."
18 Jun 00 - CJD - Risk of CJD is higher in north Jonathan Leake
Sunday Times ... Sunday 18 June 2000
Northerners could be at several times more risk from variant CJD , the human form of "mad cow" disease, than those living in the Midlands and south, a study by government scientists has found, writes.
The research, carried out by the Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease Surveillance Unit, also shows that the rate of incidence of the disease, which is always fatal, is rising across Britain .
The figures remain too low to estimate accurately how many people will ultimately be affected. Estimates range from hundreds to many thousands .
Variations in the incidence of the disease are a matter of deep concern . In the north of England - north of Manchester and including Yorkshire and Humberside - there were 3.14 cases per million people over the five years to 1999. Scotland had the second highest rate at 2.98 cases per million .
The West Midlands emerged as the safest place with just 0.36 cases per million. East Anglia and the south experienced, respectively, 0.93 and 1.37 cases per
#18 Jun 00 - CJD - Risk of CJD is higher in north
Knacker's yard link to Queniborough nvCJD cluster
Sun, 13 Aug 2000 Jonathan Leake and Dipesh Gadher Sunday Times Additional reporting: Graham Hind
BRITAIN'S worst outbreak of the human form of mad-cow disease may be linked to a nearby knacker's yard that sold meat from diseased animals. The yard operated just eight miles from Queniborough, the Leicestershire village where health officials are investigating the first known cluster of CJD cases. Three people who spent time in the village died from CJD in 1998, and a fourth person is suspected of having the degenerative brain disease. Another victim lived just three miles away.
The possible link to the knacker's yard - which recycled animals unfit for human consumption into pet food and other products - dates back 20 years, to about the time when scientists now believe the BSE epidemic may have begun.
Two meat traders from Bedfordshire were convicted in 1982 of buying unapproved beef from W E Mason & Sons of Wigston, near Leicester, and selling it to an unsuspecting butcher in Hertfordshire.
Last week officials seized council documents and court reports relating to the company to determine whether any unfit meat may have entered the human food chain locally.
"We have had a very useful series of conversations about this with Oadby and Wigston council," said Philip Monk, a consultant in communicable disease control at Leicestershire health authority, who is heading the Queniborough investigation. "I am ruling nothing in and nothing out. Anything we have that is potentially helpful in explaining local meat trading practices has to be examined."
The case heard by Leicester magistrates in 1982 was the culmination of Operation Meat Hook, a joint investigation between detectives and environmental health officers from three counties.
The teams covertly observed Peter Fletcher, a partner in a wholesale butcher's business near Dunstable, on four occasions in 1980 when he visited Leonard Mason, the yard's owner. He loaded beef carcasses from the yard into an un-marked van, which had been contaminated by a cow's head "fouled by stomach contents", according to evidence given in court. One of the carcasses was later found to have been infected with pleurisy.
Fletcher marked the meat with a fake inspector's stamp, and then left it with a retail butcher near Hemel Hempstead, Hertfordshire.
"A knacker's yard may, and frequently will, deal with diseased cattle," the prosecutor had told an earlier hearing. "Meat may be partly decomposed and contaminated. Disease is rife in such premises and could include anthrax and tuberculosis."
Fletcher was jailed for three months and fined ?500. His partner, Francis Fensome, received a suspended prison sentence. Mason was cleared after telling the court that he had been told the meat was to be used to feed animals at Whipsnade zoo [site of two cheetah BSE fatalities -- webmaster]
The knacker's yard, which had been run by the Mason family since 1947, was closed the same year and now stands derelict. Mason has since died.
Last week his brother, Jack Mason, said: "I am confident there is no connection with us and the outbreak in Queniborough. Most of the meat went to zoos. Any meat that was sold locally went to dog owners as pet food."
There is no proof that Mason dealt in cattle infected with BSE, which was not recognised at the time. But such yards commonly dealt in "downer" cows - those displaying symptoms of illness - so any animals that did have BSE were likely to have ended up in such places.
The Queniborough inquiry team is also examining slaughtering techniques at Leicestershire abattoirs and childhood eating habits of those who grew up in the village, although school meals have been ruled out as a possible cause of the CJD outbreak.
Arthur Beyless lost his daughter, Pamela, 24, a bank worker, to the disease after a two-year struggle for survival. Although the Beylesses live in nearby Glenfield, Pamela regularly visited her grandparents in Queniborough and the family often bought meat from Ian Bramley, the village butcher, in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Beyless said: "On one occasion I was buying some meat when Ian told me he'd got it for 'a good deal'. It does make you wonder when you consider this theory about the knacker's yard. This disease is something that might never have happened if people weren't always grasping for that last penny."
The other two named victims with links to Queniborough are Stacey Robinson, 19, who lived there for 12 years before moving to another part of the county, and Glen Day, 34, who worked on a farm in the area. He regularly ate at the Horse and Groom pub, which was supplied with meat by Bramley.
Bramley died in a car crash. His stepmother, Hazel Bramley, said she knew nothing about Mason's yard. "We bought our meat directly from local farmers," she said. "The animals were slaughtered in Leicester and delivered to us. I don't know anything about this place in Wigston."
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy: Epidemiological studies
The Queniborough CJD cluster
New claims link CJD to water supply
The BSE Inquiry / Statement No 491
Mr Robert Edmunds
Issued 09/08/1999 (not scheduled to give oral evidence)
THE BSE INQUIRY
STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE ENVIRONMENT AGENCY CONCERNING THRUXTED MILL
BY ROBERT BARRY EDMUNDS
1. Introduction
1.1 I am the Regional Water Quality Manager for the Environment Agency (the Agency) Southern Region. I am a Member of the Chartered Institution of Water and Environmental Management. The purpose of my job is to organise, manage and direct the Water Quality Function in the Region in accordance with National and Regional policy and to formulate Regional policy and some National policy.
1.2 I have been employed by the Agency or its predecessors since 1970. My work has included most aspects of water quality control in the natural environment including groundwater with considerable emphasis on planning matters. It has also involved different aspects of risk assessment and I played a major part in the establishment of Southern Region’s Aquifer Protection Policy and contributed to it’s successor, the Environment Agency’s National Groundwater Protection Policy.
2. Involvement of the Environment Agency in the BSE Inquiry
2.1 The Agency was invited in a letter dated 26th March 1998 from the Inquiry Solicitor, to comment on statements submitted to the Inquiry by Dr A C F Colchester and Mr J Williams. These statements both mentioned the Agency and criticised evidence submitted by the Agency to a Planning Inquiry held in February 1997. The Planning Inquiry concerned a proposed new soak away drainage system at Thruxted Mill Rendering Plant in Kent.
2.2 The Agency was unable to respond fully to the requests in time for the Inquiry Solicitor to use the information on Monday 30th March 1998, which was when Dr Colchester and Mr Williams presented their evidence to the BSE Inquiry (T 13 (Vol. T2 Tab 3)).
2.3 At that time, the Agency was also asked to submit written evidence to the Inquiry and did so at the beginning of May 1998. The evidence concerns the role of the Agency in relation to the BSE issue, the Agency’s powers and duties and the assessment of risks to human health via the environment, carried out by the Agency. Although the Agency’s involvement with the Thruxted Mill Planning Inquiry was, of necessity, included as part of the overall picture, no attempt was made to answer the critical points in the submissions of Dr Colchester and Mr Williams.
2.4 Given that no decision has yet been made on the Thruxted Mill Planning Inquiry, it is considered inappropriate for the criticisms of the Agency to be left unchallenged. This evidence therefore specifically addresses the submissions made by Dr Colchester and Mr Williams.
2.5 The evidence now submitted by the Agency is therefore specific to Thruxted Mill. It addresses the points raised by Dr Colchester and Mr Williams, but also takes the opportunity to update the relevant risk assessments. Nothing in this evidence in any way alters or qualifies the evidence submitted by the Environment Agency to the Thruxted Mill Planning Inquiry.
2.6 The main evidence is in the form of statements from consultants employed by the Agency, as follows:
"Statement on behalf of the Environment Agency concerning Thruxted Mill", by Mr C P Young, WRc Plc, covering geological and hydrogeological factors.
"Statement on behalf of the Environment Agency concerning Thruxted Mill", by Dr P Gale, WRc Plc, covering the nature of prions and infectivity.
"Statement on behalf of the Environment Agency concerning Thruxted Mill", by Mr P Comer, Det Norske Veritas, covering overall risk assessment.
3. Non Technical Matters
3.1 There were a number of non technical criticisms of the Environment Agency contained in the statements submitted by Dr Colchester and Mr Williams and also in Mr Williams’ supplementary papers: "BSE and nvCJD - The Kent/Hampshire Connection - Part I: The Smarden Spill and the origin of BSE", and a similarly titled paper - Part II. Some of these non-technical criticisms are addressed below.
3.2 The Agency does not wish to address any matters contained in Mr Williams’ Part I Smarden paper (M70 Tab 3). The Precautionary Principle (See WS No.18 paragraph 18, WS No.19 paragraph 12, Part II of "BSE and nvCJD – the Kent/Hampshire Connection [M70 Tab 4])
3.3 The underlying basis of the Government’s precautionary principle is that where there are significant risks of damage to the environment, pollution controls will take into account the need to prevent or limit harm, even where scientific knowledge is not conclusive. (Planning and Policy Guidance Note number 23 - HMSO 1994).
3.4 The Agency’s view at the beginning of the Thruxted Mill Planning Inquiry was that there was virtually no risk to human health in relation to drinking water supplies resulting from effluent disposal at Thruxted. This has remained the Agency’s view throughout. It was therefore inappropriate to apply the precautionary principle.
3.5 The Agency has nevertheless carried out rigorous regulatory pollution control and enforcement in relation to the Thruxted Mill operation and this is documented as part of evidence previously submitted to the BSE Inquiry (DO 01 Tab 12).
Alleged cluster of nvCJD cases
(See WS No. 18 paragraph 4)
3.6 The Agency is not of course the Health Authority, but nevertheless considered any evidence pertinent to the transmission of nvCJD infectivity via the environment. Attention is therefore drawn to the report of the East Kent Health Authority, "An Investigation of the local cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease in East Kent, Interim Report", (February 1997) (M70 Tab 2), which concludes:
i) "On the basis of knowledge available at present, there does not appear to be any evidence to suggest that there is a local cluster of cases of CJD in East Kent. (Cluster is defined as two or more linked cases)."
ii) "The suggestion that the BSE epidemic started in Kent and spread to other parts of the country does not appear to be accurate."
iii) "On the basis of knowledge available at present, there does not appear to be any evidence to suggest that the confirmed cases of CJD are linked to any local factors including Thruxted Mill. Caution needs to be expressed as this is an evolving situation and if there is further evidence available, this conclusion may have to be revised."
This report was submitted to the Thruxted Mill Planning Inquiry by the Environment Agency, in February 1997.
3.7 The conclusions of a subsequent report by East Kent Health Authority, "An Investigation of the local cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease in East Kent", September 1998, are as follows (M 11D Tab 3):
"On the basis of knowledge available at present the following conclusions can be drawn:
a. There does not appear to be any evidence to indicate an increase in the number of sporadic cases of CJD in Kent more than what is expected for this population.
b. There does not appear to be any evidence to link all the cases of new variant CJD to a common water supply and therefore it is unlikely that water is the vehicle of infection resulting in the reported cases of new variant CJD in Kent.
c. There is no evidence to suggest inhalation as a possible mode of transmission with Thruxted Mill as the source causing the reporting cases of new variant CJD in Kent.
Caution needs to be expressed as this is an evolving situation and if there is further evidence available in future these conclusions may need to be revised."
Basic stance of the Environment Agency
(See WS No.18 paragraph 17; WS No.19 paragraph 40)
3.8 The Agency’s duties and responsibilities are described in its evidence to the Thruxted Mill Planning Inquiry and in previous evidence submitted to the BSE Inquiry. In the case of the Thruxted Mill Planning Inquiry, the Agency has impartially investigated and assessed evidence. It neither set out to establish that there was significant risk or to establish that there was not. The conclusions of negligible risk result from the Agency’s assessment of all the information obtained.
Issued on behalf of the witness by:
The BSE Inquiry Press Office
6th Floor Hercules House
Hercules Road
London SE1 7DU
Fax: 0171 803 0893
Website: http://www.bse.org.uk
email: inquiry@bse.org.uk
The BSE Inquiry / Statement No 19C
Dr Alan Colchester
Issued 27/01/2000
STATEMENT BY DR A C F COLCHESTER IN RESPONSE TO
WS490 DATED 09/08/99 BY MR C P YOUNG
1. Statement WS490 by Mr C. P. Young, Principal Hydrogeologist, Soil Waste and Ground Water Group, WRc, Medmenham, Bucks, concerned geological and hydrogeological factors which may control the movement and attenuation of BSE infectivity in water in the environment, and referred to specific points raised in WS18 and WS19 of March 1998.
2. WS490 referred particularly to the potential impact of the discharges from Thruxted Mill on the ground water, particularly because of its proximity to drinking water extraction bore holes. However, it did not consider the other risks arising from material delivered to or discharged from this factory.
3. In paragraph 18 [WS490], Mr Young described his conclusions about the probable rate of flow of water through the unsaturated zone. This would be slow, with the result that it would take from a few to several tens of years for material to travel from the surface to the water table. It is likely that such slow transmission applies at many parts of the discharge zone around Thruxted Mill. This is true whether or not there are also locations where transit through to the water table is faster. It is therefore clear that some of the material discharged many years ago may only now be beginning to reach the aquifer. This is one of several reasons why the past history of discharges at Thruxted Mill continues to be important.
4. Mr Young gave a very clear review of the potential behaviour of water and dissolved or particulate materials when soaking through a medium such as chalk
2
which may contain variable numbers of large fissures. The presence of significant numbers of fissures, or the use of a borehole or old well for discharge purposes, would provide a rapid route to the water table through which a variety of particulate substances could pass. Mr Young referred to ‘the absence of persuasive evidence of rapid movement via fissures of water and dissolved or particulate materials from the surface to the water table at Thruxted Mill’ [WS490 para 20].
In my view, it should be borne in mind that absence of persuasive evidence is not persuasive evidence of absence. The physical existence of potential routes allowing rapid transit is one type of evidence; evidence from water samples (tested for conventional pathogens, ionic substances etc) is another.
5. My Young also provided a clear review of the potential mechanisms of removal of particulate matter from liquid passing through intact chalk [WS490] (ie. not through large fissures or boreholes). He discussed the potential for filtration and adsorption of particles carrying BSE prions. In my view, the problem about this is that prions can exist in several physico-chemical forms. The range of types of particles which might exist in the inputs and outputs of a rendering factory and which might carry BSE prions is simply not known with confidence. In particular, the rendering process itself will alter the properties of lipid and protein particles. We do not know enough to quantify the possibility that particles may exist in a form that could pass through the chalk matrix. We certainly know that, in laboratory conditions, preparations of infective material are often passed through a microporous filter, with pore sizes of less that 0.5 micron. This does not generally attenuate prion infectivity but does remove most other pathogens.
6. In paragraph 26, final bullet point, Mr Young referred to pore sizes used in the laboratory of ‘500 micrometers’ [WS490] (one micrometer is one millionth of a metre or one micron). I presume this is a typographical error, because he should have referred to nanometers (a nanometer is one thousand millionth of a meter). 7. Considering what is now known about the potential infectivity of rendering factory output, there would seem to be an overwhelming case for its classification as toxic waste. However, in the historical context, rendering factory outputs appear to have
3
been classified with strong organic and biodegradable effluents. The Environment Agency emphasise the consistency of their approach, as if this were to be commended, an attitude which seems dangerously inflexible in the light of the new information about the risks to human health of the products of rendering.
Within the historically accepted class of strong organic and biodegradable effluents, the categorisation should clearly be low nutrient/ industrial effluent (Policy and Practice for the Protection of Groundwater, National Rivers Authority, 1992). When the discharge area is near a water supply borehole, the ground above is graded into three Source Protection Zones: the Inner Protection Zone (based on a 50 day travel time from any point below the water table to the source); the Outer Protection Zone (400 days); and the Source Catchment Zone (the remaining catchment area of the ground water source). The approach to regulation of discharge, according to the type of effluent and the travel times to the water extraction point, is shown as a matrix (table) on page 36 of the NRA booklet (Appendix 1 [YB92/00.00/10.1]). Appendix 1 shows that there is an important threshold between the Outer Protection Zone and the Source Catchment Zone, because, in the former (areas closer then 400 days transit time to the water supply extraction point), discharges of low nutrient content or industrial effluent should be automatically prohibited.
8. In paragraph 21 of WS490, Mr Young referred to Thruxted Mill’s location as being in an area in which time for flow in a saturated zone to the boreholes is “about 400 days, or greater”. In the light of the historical importance of this 400 day threshold, I examined the situation of Thruxted Mill in relation to the 400 day transit time to the nearest borehole (Godmersham). Maps included in the Environment Agency’s studies confirm that the Mill in fact must lie extremely close to that threshold. Two such maps are reproduced here for ease of comparison: Appendix 2 is p 16, fig 2.3 (‘Hydrogeological features of the area around Thruxted Mill’), from C.P. Young et al “Assessment of the Potential Impact of Past and Present Disposal of Effluent from Thruxted Mill on Ground Water Quality”, March 1997 [M70 Tab 9]. Appendix 3 is fig 1 (‘Location map’) from WS490 itself. The 400 day threshold line has clearly been drawn freehand (compare the two maps in the Appendices), and indeed small differences in drawing could lead to the Mill lying inside or
4
outside the Outer Protection Zone. The transit time from Thruxted Mill to the aquifer in the saturated zone appears only to have been estimated very approximately. More accurate measurement might well indicate a shorter transit time. If this were to be the case, the Environment Agency should have prohibited discharge long ago, even assuming that no new, more stringent, regulation was applied to take account of the recent discovery of serious risks to humans of BSE contaminated material. It is accepted that the NRA document is not prescriptive and while it seeks to control activities within certain travel time zones around public water supply sources, it allows for individual site specific assessment (Canterbury Planning Inquiry, EA Proof of Evidence, section EA 1, Pages 7 & 8, Groundwater Protection Policies). However, in the case of Thruxted Mill, the heightened concern about the safety of discharges should clearly have led to a more, rather than a less, stringent interpretation of the Policies.
9. In paragraph 22, Mr Young referred to the February 1997 Public Planning Inquiry in Canterbury [WS490]. Concerning the old well on the site of the Mill, he says that ‘its potential impact on groundwater quality was not assessed’. However, as my second statement to the BSE Inquiry [WS19B] showed, the EA were fully informed about the recent allegations of discharges into the well as early as June 1996. The EA have also admitted that the NRA/ EA had been fully aware of the presence of the well on the site for some years previously, and that the well had only been partially backfilled with sand in 1978, which would of course have allowed its continuing use as a discharge route. The EA were requested, at the pre-Planning Inquiry meeting in Canterbury in December 1996, to take full account of the well, although Counsel acting for the EA argued that it was irrelevant (cf WS19B para 59). Furthermore, Mr Young’s report, which was dated March 1997 [M70 Tab 9], contained extensive data obtained before the Planning Inquiry. It is quite clear from that report that many of the analyses contained in it must have been completed well before the publication date of the report, in other words well before the Planning Inquiry. In summary, while I agree that the ‘potential impact on groundwater quality’ of the well ‘was not assessed in the context of the Planning Inquiry’, the relevant data and analyses were available at the time of the Inquiry. In my opinion,
5
these data should have been discussed at the Planning Inquiry, and my reasons were made very clear before and during that Inquiry itself.
10. In paragraph 24 [WS490], Mr Young refers to readings quoted by the EA showing that the rate of fall of the water level in the well during late 1996 was low. This implied that the well had become ‘blinded’. However, the data about the rate of soaking away obtained in late 1996 do not provide any information about the time when the ‘blinding’ may have taken place. In the risk assessments referred to by Young in his report dated March 1997 [M79 Tab 9] it was assumed that the rate of leakage from the well had smoothly reduced from 1988 to 1996. This is complete speculation. The arbitrary assumption of a gradual reduction over many years generated predictions which appeared to contradict one of the allegations by a former contractor who worked on the site (who had stated that he had seen flexible hoses dragged to the top of the well and effluent being discharged through them). These apparent contradictions were used by the EA and by solicitors acting for Canterbury Mills Ltd to argue that the former contractor’s evidence was unreliable. In my view, exactly the opposite conclusions were more logical. That is, the possibility that the blinding was a recent event was not only plausible a priori, but such an interpretation was supported by the observations alleged by the former contractor of the use of the well as a route of discharge. 11. In paragraph 26 [WS490], final bullet point, Mr Young refers to the precautionary principle. He quotes PPG 23, where the precautionary principle is set out. PPG 23 requires that the precautionary principal should be applied when ‘there is perceived to be an unacceptable risk’, even if it ‘cannot be scientifically quantified’. Young’s argument is circular. He merely states that because the EA, or the scientific consultants acting for the EA, did not themselves ‘perceive there to be an unacceptable risk’, the precautionary principle automatically did not apply. Any serious debate about this issue should address the question of how to define ‘an unacceptable risk which cannot be scientifically quantified’.
12. Once again, the Environment Agency has focused specifically on the issue of the possibility of transmission by the water supply. I regard the water supply pathway
6
as representing only a very small risk, but one which is very hard to quantify and one which would potentially affect a large number of people. The debate about water supply should not divert attention from the existence of several other potential pathways which need to be considered and evaluated. In my discussions about the potential risks associated with rendering, and the whole approach to its regulation, I have repeatedly stressed that there is a spectrum of possible risks, associated with various environmental pathways and various possible portals of entry into the body. In my opinion, the recent statements by the Environment Agency and its contractors have not invalidated the very strong case to support the view that the precautionary principle should be applied to the disposal of liquid effluent and sludge from rendering factories. In particular, it should be applied to the proposed new subsoil drainage method, as well as to the existing discharge method in use at Thruxted Mill.
Issued on behalf of the witness by: The BSE Inquiry Press Office 6th Floor Hercules House Hercules Road London SE1 7DU Fax: 0171 803 0893 Website: http://www.bse.org.uk email: inquiry@bse.org.uk
Volume 6: Human Health, 1989-96
10. Pollution control and waste management
Thruxted Mill
Treatment and disposal of waste products from the rendering process
New effluent treatment plant and disposal system
10.121 Some of the events relating to the Thruxted Mill which gave rise to issues of interest to the Inquiry occurred at dates outside the terms of reference of the Inquiry. However, evidence relating to Thruxted Mill illustrated some aspects of the waste disposal processes in a rendering plant during the period up to 20 March 1996 and sheds light on how local authorities and other government bodies assessed the impact of BSE on pollution.
10.122 Thruxted Mill is a rendering plant in the Canterbury area and has been in operation since 1917. On 1 May 1996 it was licensed as one of the plants authorised to render specified bovine material (SBM) and cattle culled under the Government's Over Thirty Months Scheme (OTMS). 1 In late June 1996 the Environment Agency (Southern Region) commissioned a risk assessment on the impact of the disposal of cattle effluent from the Thruxted Mill site. In March 1997 the risk assessment report noted the plant was licensed to process approximately 2,000 carcasses per week (equating to around 1,000 tonnes of material each week). 2
10.123 The Mill is located above the North Downs chalk aquifer, which has long been used for public water supply. The Environment Agency report identified two operational public water supply boreholes, serving 140,000 people, located within 3.25 km of the Mill, both of which were in operation for many years before the onset of BSE. A third non-operational borehole was located 3.5 km north of the Mill. 3
10.124 The Environment Agency reported that the Mill was not connected to main drainage and was approximately two kilometres from the nearest foul sewer. Since the early 1970s most of the surface drainage (from yards and roofs in the plant complex) had been directed through the effluent-holding tank and subsequent treatment systems. Earlier arrangements for surface drainage were uncertain, but it was understood that during the 1960s the yard drainage was directed to a large-diameter well. The report found evidence to suggest 'that small amounts of surface water have been discharged to the well until recently'. 4
snip...see;
Volume 6: Human Health, 1989-96 10. Pollution control and waste management Spreading blood on land 10.137 On average, a slaughtered cow yields about 13.6 kg of blood. While blood is not the main product of the slaughtering process, valuable uses could usually be found for most of it. A small amount was sold for use in the manufacture of processed food (eg, black pudding, adhesives for sausages), pet food, fertiliser, glue, foam fire extinguishers and pharmaceuticals and the preparation of leather. 1 However, most blood collected in slaughterhouses went to renderers to be made into blood meal for use in animal feed manufacture. 2
10.138 Where no valuable use could be found it was not uncommon at the onset of the BSE crisis for the unprocessed blood to be spread on land, including grazing land.
10.139 For the slaughterhouse operator spreading blood on land was an inexpensive way to dispose of a by-product which would otherwise be viewed as waste. For a farmer on whose fields the blood was spread it was a useful fertilisation measure. Therefore, it recycled an otherwise useless by-product of one process for use in another. It could only be done subject to the consent of the local authority, and the landowner had to be licensed under the Control of Pollution Act 1974. 3 Once the blood had been spread the Diseases of Animals (Waste Food) Order 1973 (Waste Food Order), which applied across Great Britain, prohibited the farmer from allowing livestock or poultry access to the fields until enough time had passed for all blood to disappear from the ground or grass. 4 The Diseases of Animals (Waste Food) Order 1974 had a similar effect in Northern Ireland. 5 The Orders do not state, in terms, how long animals had to be kept off the fields. Interpretation of the Orders seems to have been left up to the discretion of the relevant Agriculture Departments.
10.140 The State Veterinary Service (SVS) closely monitored the practice of spreading blood on land. 6
10.141 In a letter to Mr Derek Wilson (VO) dated 5 June 1989, Dr Matthews (SVO) made it clear that he considered MAFF's position on the practice of spreading unprocessed blood on land to be outdated, as it was based on guidelines issued in 1978:
When blood has been used as a fertilizer, the dressed field should not be grazed for 4 months in the case of bovine/sheep blood, and 6 months in the case of pig blood. If liquid slaughterhouse waste is being spread, then it becomes more difficult to specify any time period before allowing animals access to the field. This will depend on the nature of the waste and its contents. 7 10.142 Dr Matthews went on to say that these guidelines were now inadequate 'to deal with a practice that has become more widespread with the rising cost of disposal of waste', but that it was all the advice that he could offer. He did not explain why he thought the guidelines were inadequate.
10.143 In September 1989, Mr Wilson visited a farm that used slaughterhouse blood as fertiliser on its fields. He described the practice to Mr Mott, the DVO:
Blood and slaughterhouse waste have been spread on the land for about 25 years. [A] tanker (2000 gallon capacity) with a spray on the back takes liquid waste which is blood and washing water from slaughterhouse to farm daily. 'This is usually half full'. Waste is sprayed almost every day on arable or pasture depending on time of year. I inspected one field of stubble turnips where the last waste had been sprayed on the weekend. Small clots about 1cm across with the appearance of dropped solder were apparent across the soil and vegetation surface about every 5cm. When sprayed on the grass the practice is to 'wait for rain to wash the blood in'. The blood is never spread near standing cattle who are reported to be frightened of the spreader. 8 10.144 Mr Wilson wrote that in spring the time between applying the blood and allowing cattle to graze on the affected land was four to six weeks and that a lapse of six months was 'unacceptable' to the farmer. Mr Wilson concluded that the farmer 'seems to be adopting a sensible attitude to spraying and disposal but only 4-6 weeks can, from time to time, elapse between application and grazing' but added that the presence of rooks and seagulls feeding on the affected land 'could act as a vehicle for the spread of rapidly transmissible disease to other farms'. 9
10.145 Mr Wilson's report sparked an exchange of correspondence over the next few months. Mr Kevin Taylor took the view that the MAFF guidelines needed revision, and that delays of four to six months were difficult to justify on veterinary grounds, when such a quarantine period was not required for pasture in the event of a confirmed notifiable disease. He was 'positive about the insignificance of the practice in relation to BSE', and did not think that the Waste Food Order was being contravened, provided all of the blood had soaked into the fields before cattle were allowed to graze. 10 Mr Ray Bradley, Head of the MAFF Pathology Department, wrote:
On the basis of current evidence I would not have thought that spreading bovine blood from healthy animals on fields is a significant risk for exposing them to BSE agent in sufficient quantity to produce disease. No animals should graze fields after blood treatment until sufficient time has elapsed to ensure destruction of all known conventional pathogenic organisms and until it is no longer recognisable as blood (ie. degraded to 'fertiliser' status). The length of this period should be determined by someone with experience of these factors but I would not have thought it would need to be more than a few weeks. 11 10.146 When consulted on this issue, Dr Richard Kimberlin expressed his opinion that four to six months was a suitable interval to allow between spreading blood on land and allowing animals to graze on that land, to ensure that conventional pathogenic organisms were destroyed. 12 Mr Hugh Fraser of NPU thought that six months was appropriate. 13
10.147 Mr Meldrum tended to the view that, for both scientific and presentational reasons, consideration should be given to amending the Waste Food Order to prohibit the spreading of slaughterhouse waste in its raw state on farm land. On 4 December 1989 he requested Mr Taylor and his colleagues to advise him on this. 14
10.148 The Inquiry did not find any evidence of Mr Taylor's response to Mr Meldrum on this issue. However, in a minute to Mr Lawrence dated 15 February 1991 he wrote that:
. . . the practice [of spreading unprocessed blood on land] is widespread and may have become more so. It has also been going on for a long time without, so far as I am aware, being responsible for the spread of animal disease. The emergence of BSE does not alter the situation much: there is no evidence that the titre of infectious agent which may be present in blood is significant, and when we last checked there had been no cases of BSE on the organic farms which used blood as a fertiliser. The Waste Food Order controls seem to be effective in practice. Time intervals are not laid down between spreading and stock access, but variability is necessary to allow for variability in weather and soil conditions, and it would be difficult to make statutory provision for this. 15 <<Previous | Next>> Return to top of page 1 J F Gracey, Meat Hygiene, 1986, pp. 100-1: M43A tab 13
2 YB90/12.18/3.10
3 L1A tab 2
4 L1 tab 3 article 6(2)(a)
5 L5A tab 11 article 4(4)
6 YB90/12.18/3.10
7 YB89/6.05/9.1-9.2
8 YB89/9.12/15.1
9 YB89/9.12/15.2
10 YB89/10.02/10.1-10.2
11 YB89/10.10/2.2
12 YB89/10.30/5.1
13 YB89/10.31/1.1
14 YB89/12.04/1.1
15 YB91/2.15/3.1
FINAL REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE NORTH LEI...RSHIRE CLUSTER OF VARIANT CREUTZFELDT-JAKOB DISEASE
SUMMARY OF THE FINAL REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE NORTH LEICESTERSHIRE CLUSTER OF VARIANT CREUTZFELDT-JAKOB DISEASE
The investigation was carried out by Dr Gerry Bryant and Dr Philip Monk who have prepared and present this report to Leicestershire Health Authority.
INTRODUCTION
The cluster of variant Creutzfeld-Jakob disease in the North Leicestershire area was first recognised in July 2000. Between August 1996 and January 1999 five people developed symptoms that were later recognised as being those of variant Creutzfeld-Jakob disease and they have all died. They all lived in the Wreake and Soar Valley area in North Leicestershire from 1980 until 1991.
The investigation concentrated on the period from 1980 to 1991, as this was the only time period when a common exposure could have occurred.
1. INITIAL FIELDWORK
At least one relative of the people with variant Creutzfeld-Jakob disease was interviewed to examine possible exposures to the BSE (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy) Agent. A questionnaire study was carried out with parents of children at Queniborough Primary School to examine their purchase and consumption of food when they were children themselves during the 1980s.
This was followed by a questionnaire study of people living in the village of Queniborough. The questionnaire asked those people who were parents of children of similar age to the cases about their purchase and consumption of meat during the 1980s. Butchers, farmers, auctioneers and others involved in the meat trade were interviewed to build a picture of the dairy and beef industries during the 1980s.
2. RESULTS FROM THIS INITIAL FIELDWORK
1. Possible Exposures
3. A number of possible risk factors were unlikely to provide an explanation for a link between the people with variant Creutzfeld-Jakob disease. They were: -
● Surgery and blood transfusions
● Dental surgery
● Occupational exposure
● Immunisations
● Injections, body piercing, cuts and animal bites
● Baby foods, school meals and drinking water
Manganese (data from the British Geological Survey showed that the area of Leicestershire does not have a high level of Manganese in the soil)
● FINAL REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE NORTH LEI...RSHIRE CLUSTER OF VARIANT CREUTZFELDT-JAKOB DISEASE http://www.leics-ha.org.uk/cjd/cjdbrief.htm (1 of 7) [3/21/2001 3:38:40 PM]
INVESTIGATION INTO FARMING PRACTICE
Cattle raising practice
Local beef cattle were raised alongside dairy cattle. This meant that beef cattle were fed meat and bone meal supplements from the age of 6 days rather than 6 months, which is the case for pure beef herds. They therefore had a greater lifetime exposure to the BSE agent in meat and bone meal than cattle who did not receive meat and bone meal until the age of 6 months.
The area of Leicestershire that supplied beef cattle to the local food trade had a moderately high incidence for BSE meaning that a number of cattle across a number of farms had the disease.
At the beginning of the 1980s, local beef cattle were a by-product of the dairy industry and were usually Friesian Hereford crossbred cattle. Such cattle were usually slaughtered between 30 and 36 months of age because they are slower to fatten.
The average age for onset of BSE in cattle was between 4 and 5 years. However, the BSE Inquiry notes that although the numbers were small, there were a few cases in which clinical onset occurred between 20 and 30 months. The youngest animal in England being just 20 months old. This means that the older Friesian cross bred cattle used in the meat trade in Leicestershire were more likely to have sub-clinical BSE infection and to be infectious. Back calculations from the BSE epidemic suggest that British cattle must have had BSE from the mid 1970s onwards. This area of Leicestershire reported BSE as soon as it became notifiable in 1988 which means that some cattle were likely to have had BSE during the period that we were investigating.
1. Cattle slaughtering practice
In both large and small abattoirs, cattle were slaughtered using a captive bolt. In the local abattoirs and butchers who slaughtered, a pithing rod was also used. (see appendix – terminology) In small abattoirs the carcass was wiped down with a cloth to remove unwanted tissue. In large abattoirs the carcass would be hosed down. In the early 1980s there was no legal requirement to hose down a carcass. Skilled butchers reported that hosing a carcass down would make the meat go ‘sour’. The practice of wiping a carcass with a cloth meant that there was a possibility of cross contamination of meat with brain and nervous tissue in those butchers who removed the brain from a beast’s head.
2.
3. Carcass purchase
Most butchers in the area bought meat from wholesale suppliers. A small number would select cattle at Melton Market or directly from a local farm for slaughter either by themselves or in a small nearby abattoir.
Wholesale meat suppliers purchased carcasses from a number of abattoirs that in turn selected cattle from a number of cattle auctions.
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RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION INTO BUTCHERING AND MEAT PROCESSING Butchering practice
Whole carcass processing
A small number of butchers either slaughtered beasts in their own small abattoirs or had beasts slaughtered by a nearby small abattoir. The butcher then processed the whole carcass. For those butchers who had a market for brain, they removed it from the beast during the process of recovery of head meat. The rest of the carcass was then boned and jointed. The removal of brain meant that there was the possibility that other meat could be contaminated with brain material. Brain contains the BSE agent and is therefore potentially infectious. During the 1980s, this process was legal and represented traditional butchering practice. It was decreasing because of a declining consumer market for brain. In the past and in particular during the war years, brain had been seen as an excellent source of protein.
1. 2. Wholesale purchase 1.
By the beginning of the 1980s many butchers had moved to purchasing either sides of beef, quarters of beef or vacuum packed pre-prepared cuts of beef rather than whole carcasses. A small number of these butchers would also purchase heads in order to remove the tongues to prepare for pressed tongue and sometimes the cheek meat usually for pet food. It was very rare for such butchers to remove the brain, as by this time there was often no market for brain.
2. 3. THE HYPOTHESIS
Our initial work suggested that there was an association between the cases of variant Creutzfeld-Jakob Disease and the consumption of beef purchased from butchers where there was a risk of ‘cross-contamination’ of beef carcass meat with bovine brain. The essential elements of our hypothesis are that:-
● the beasts used were locally reared cattle the beef cattle were a by-product of the beef industry and therefore fed meat and bone meal from day 6 onwards giving them a greater lifetime exposure to feedstuff that was potentially contaminated with the BSE agent
● they were predominantly Friesian crossbred cattle which were slow to fatten and therefore slaughtered at close to three years
● they were slaughtered in small abattoirs which employed pithing and without the washing down of the carcass
● ● the heads were split to remove the brain
● during brain removal, if the meninges (the membrane that covers the brain) are broken, FINAL REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE NORTH LEI...RSHIRE CLUSTER OF VARIANT CREUTZFELDT-JAKOB DISEASE http://www.leics-ha.org.uk/cjd/cjdbrief.htm (3 of 7) [3/21/2001 3:38:40 PM] because brain is of a gelatinous consistency, when handled, it then has a tendency to be adherent
● carcasses were wiped with cloths increasing the risk of cross-contamination
TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS
Our study to test the hypothesis was carried out with the approval of the Leicestershire Research Ethics Committee.
A relative of each case variant Creutzfeld-Jakob Disease in the cluster was re-interviewed using a structured questionnaire. The questionnaire asked about dietary history including meat consumption and from where meat was purchased during the period 1980 to 1991. A relative of each of thirty age-matched controls, six for each case, was interviewed using the same questionnaire. An attempt was made to interview all butchers, supermarkets and freezer food centres identified by the controls to ascertain whether they or their suppliers used cattle heads and removed bovine brain, thus creating the opportunity for cross-contamination.
1. RESULTS OF THE CASE CONTROL STUDY
Butchers, supermarkets and freezer food centres used by cases and controls Four of the people who developed variant Creutzfeld-Jakob Disease bought and consumed beef from one of two butchers during the early 1980s. One of these butchers slaughtered beasts in his own abattoir. This butcher normally processed three beasts a week. He ceased trading in 1989. The other butcher had beasts slaughtered in a small nearby abattoir. He processed four to five beasts a week. This butcher’s business ceased trading in December 1982. It has not been possible to trace the butcher who was used regularly by one family during the first half of the 1980s. It is unlikely that he removed brains or even purchased the heads of beasts. He did not slaughter beasts himself or use a small local abattoir. People acting as controls used a total of twenty butchers, four freezer food centres and seven supermarkets. With the exception of one butcher who supplied one of the controls, all other outlets were traced and staff interviewed to ask whether they removed the brain. Three butchers used by controls removed brains. One of these butchers was also used by one of the people who developed variant Creutzfeld-Jakob Disease. With the exception of this one butcher and one other who also split the heads, the butchers used by the controls processed between one and two sides of beef or less a week. A side of beef is half of the carcass. We were able to trace both butchers and buyers who worked for the supermarkets used by people in this study. None of them reported the use of head meat during the 1980s. Sides of meat or vacuum packs were purchased from wholesalers. The wholesalers who supplied the supermarkets and freezer centres did not split heads to remove the brains. The skulls were sent either to specialist head boning plants or to renderers after removal of the head meat. The skulls were never split.
1. 2. FINAL REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE NORTH LEI...RSHIRE CLUSTER OF VARIANT CREUTZFELDT-JAKOB DISEASE http://www.leics-ha.org.uk/cjd/cjdbrief.htm (4 of 7) [3/21/2001 3:38:40 PM]
2. Interview results
The study showed that the relatives reported that the people with variant Creutzfeld-Jakob Disease were 15 times more likely to have purchased and consumed beef from a butcher who removed the brain from a beast compared with controls who purchased meat from outlets where cross contamination with brain material was not a risk. This result is statistically significant and is therefore very unlikely to be a chance finding. (p = 0.0058 and the 95% confidence interval is 1.6 to 138.9)
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
A number of factors may have influenced the result.
Our work suggests that family size, age and education of children of controls were representative of people living in the area meaning that our controls who were randomly selected are likely to be representative of people living in the area.
It is possible that we were in some way able to influence the outcome of the study by the way in which we wrote down the answers to the questions that we asked both of the cases and controls. Wherever possible we interviewed people together to ensure that the interview technique was the same. All interviews were recorded on tape. Whilst we knew the hypothesis that was being tested, at the time of the interviews we had no knowledge of the butchering practices of most of the meat suppliers identified by the controls. These butchers were interviewed after the interviews with controls had been completed.
People may not be able to remember what they gave their families to eat twenty years ago. However, our hypothesis was dependent on where people shopped and we were not attempting to identify every single item of food that was eaten. Rather we explored the usual patterns of meat consumption and the usual sources where beef was purchased.
3. CONCLUSIONS FROM THE STUDY
We have found an association which provides a biologically plausible explanation suggesting that four out of the five people with variant Creutzfeld-Jakob Disease may have been exposed to the BSE agent through the purchase and consumption of beef from a butcher’s shop where the meat could be contaminated with brain tissue. On a national basis, it is unlikely to explain how all of the people who have developed this disease were exposed to the BSE agent.
Assuming that we are correct in our explanation, we have shown that for one of the butchers, the exposure took place before December 1982. For the other the risk of the exposure continued until that butcher ceased trading in 1989. Analysis of the exposure of our cases to this butchering practice points to an incubation period for the development of variant Creutzfeld-Jakob Disease of between ten and sixteen years. This is the first time that it has been possible to provide an estimate of the incubation period.
We have shown that it is possible to examine by traditional epidemiological methods
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exposures that took place twenty years ago.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The explanation that we have found needs to be tested for other people who have died of variant Creutzfeld-Jakob Disease.
Surveillance for variant Creutzfeld-Jakob Disease needs to be maintained in Leicestershire.
5. 6. THANKS
We would like to pay tribute to the courage of the families of those people who died of variant Creutzfeld-Jakob Disease who through their willingness to relive their pain have helped us to learn more about the way in which this disease spread from animals to people.
We thank all of those who willingly gave of their time to be interviewed as controls together with the butchers, farmers, auctioneers and others in the food trade who helped us with our study. We would also like to thank all of those who provided us with help and advice in developing our study. In particular we would like to thank Professor Paul Burton, Professor of Genetic Epidemiology, University of Leicester for advice and help with the statistical analysis of the study.
Professor Bob Will and Dr Hester Ward from the National Creutzfeld-Jakob Surveillance Unit. Dr Roland Salmon and Dr Martin Wale from the Communicable Diseases Surveillance Centre of the Public Health Laboratory Service together with Dr Susan Hahne EPIET fellow, CDSC Wales.
Colleagues from University of Leicester Department of Public Health
Department of Health
Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food
Food Standards Agency
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine
Local Authorities
We would also like to thank the following without whose help and support we would not have been able to do this work.
The clinical nurse specialists in the Communicable Disease Unit at Leicestershire Health Authority who through their dedication and support enabled us to have the time to carry out this study.
Our families who have put up with our frequent absences from home and long hours of work whilst we completed this study.
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Gerry Bryant and Philip Monk
Leicestershire Health Authority 17 March 2001
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
INVESTIGATION OF VARIANT CREUTZFELD-JAKOB DISEASE
All people with variant Creutzfeld-Jakob disease are reported to the National Creutzfeld-Jakob Disease Surveillance Unit, which is based in Edinburgh. Doctors from the unit visit all people with the disease. A detailed history is taken and the diagnosis reviewed.
MEAT AND BONE MEAL
Meat and bone meal is a protein supplement fed to cattle. It was made from rendering the parts of sheep, pigs, chickens and cattle that were not consumed by people.
As little as I gram of infected material when fed to cattle is known to cause BSE in 70% of those animals fed the infected material.
In December 1988 it was recognised that the likely way in which BSE was spread was through feeding cattle protein supplements containing meat and bone meal. In November 1989, through a voluntary ban, Animal food manufacturers stopped the inclusion of any Specified Bovine Offal in Meat and Bone Meal fed to ruminants. This voluntary ban was made law in September 1990 in the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (No 2) Amendment Order 1990.
TERMINOLOGY
BSE Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
Captive bolt stunner
An instrument for stunning animals before slaughter, powered by a cartridge or compressed air which drives a bolt out of a barrel for some four inches and then retracts it into the barrel. Pithing
Insertion of a rod through the stun hole in the head of cattle to prevent the animal kicking (a reflex action which sometimes occurs after stunning)
ZM0306: Historic butchery practices
Wednesday 25 June 2003
This research project aims to determine whether butchery practices prevalent in the Queniborough area, which may have resulted in the cluster of vCJD cases, were common practice in the UK.
Study Duration Contractor Background Research Approach
Study Duration: March 2003 to September 2003
Contractor: Det Norske Veritas Consulting
Background
The report by the Leicestershire Health Authority (LHA) into the cluster of vCJD cases around Queniborough concluded that there was an association with the consumption of beef purchased from butchers where there was a risk of cross-contamination of beef carcass meat with bovine brain. The objective of this study is to determine to what extent the activities of potential concern identified in the Queniborough report were common practice throughout the UK during the peak of the BSE epidemic (1980 to 1995).
Research Approach
If possible, the study will consider how such practices may have altered over time and the impact of legislative changes. In addition the study will consider any other factors related to butchery practices that may have affected exposure to infectivity (e.g. sale of brain for human consumption).
EIGHTY-SECOND MEETING OF THE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY ADVISORY COMMITTEE
The Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee (SEAC) held its 82nd meeting in London on 29th April 2004, when it discussed the following matters:
USES OF UK COLLAGEN FROM HIDES OF UK CATTLE
In 1999 the Bovine and Bovine Products (Trade) Regulations 1999 (BBPT Regulations), prohibited the production of collagen from UK bovine hides for non-technical uses. SEAC were asked to consider the risk implications if this legislation was amended to allow the sourcing of collagen from hides of UK bovines for nontechnical use. SEAC were content with the proposed use of UK collagen for food use as the potential risk would be minimal given that the collagen would be sourced from animals fit for human consumption. In considering the risk implications for use of UK derived collagen in pharmaceutical and medical products, SEAC asked for additional information on the regulations governing enduse of collagen in these products. SEAC asked for further information on the prevalence of BSE in UK and other European countries before they could consider the relative risk of sourcing European versus UK derived bovine material.
SURVEY OF HISTORIC BUTCHERY PRACTICES
SEAC considered the results of the survey of historic butchery practices undertaken by DNV Consulting on behalf of the Food Standards Agency. The survey was commissioned following a report of an investigation by the Leicestershire Health Authority into a cluster of vCJD cases in the village of Queniborough which suggested that local butchery practices may have constituted a high risk in terms of transmission of infected material.
© SEAC 2004
Page 2 of 2
SEAC agreed with the conclusions of the survey that showed that the butchery practices in the Leicestershire area were not sufficiently different from the rest of the UK to provide a simple explanation for the cluster of vCJD cases. Although the survey confirmed that at that time, brain matter did go into the human food chain, there had been no observed increase in vCJD cases in those groups (older persons) thought to have been most likely to have consumed bovine brains. Also the survey suggested that much bovine brain produced in the UK at that time was exported to France rather than used for domestic consumption.
vCJD UPDATE
SEAC was updated on the latest statistics from the National CJD surveillance unit. Up until April 2004, a total of 146 vCJD cases have been confirmed in the UK, including 5 cases still alive. All vCJD cases tested to date are of the same genotype at codon 129 of the PrP gene (methionine homozygous). Short-term analysis of the number of deaths from vCJD in the UK continues to show statistically significant evidence that the epidemic is no longer increasing exponentially and at least in the short term, the epidemic may have peaked or come to a plateau.
SEAC 2004
Page 2 of 2
'''Although the survey confirmed that at that time, brain matter did go into the human food chain''
Historic Butchery Practices
Objective
The objective of this study is to determine to what extent the activities of potential concern identified in the Queniborough report were common practice throughout the UK during the peak of the BSE epidemic (1980 to 1995).
More information This research project aims to determine whether butchery practices prevalent in the Queniborough area, which may have resulted in the cluster of vCJD cases, were common practice in the UK.
The report by the Leicestershire Health Authority (LHA) into the cluster of vCJD cases around Queniborough concluded that there was an association with the consumption of beef purchased from butchers where there was a risk of cross-contamination of beef carcass meat with bovine brain.
Find more about this project and other FSA food safety-related projects at the
http://www.food.gov.uk/science/research/" target="_blank
Food Standards Agency Research webpage
''The report by the Leicestershire Health Authority (LHA) into the cluster of vCJD cases around Queniborough concluded that there was an association with the consumption of beef purchased from butchers where there was a risk of cross-contamination of beef carcass meat with bovine brain.''
THE tse prion aka mad cow type disease is not your normal pathogen.
The TSE prion disease survives ashing to 600 degrees celsius, that’s around 1112 degrees farenheit.
you cannot cook the TSE prion disease out of meat.
you can take the ash and mix it with saline and inject that ash into a mouse, and the mouse will go down with TSE.
Prion Infected Meat-and-Bone Meal Is Still Infectious after Biodiesel Production as well.
the TSE prion agent also survives Simulated Wastewater Treatment Processes.
IN fact, you should also know that the TSE Prion agent will survive in the environment for years, if not decades.
you can bury it and it will not go away.
The TSE agent is capable of infected your water table i.e. Detection of protease-resistant cervid prion protein in water from a CWD-endemic area.
it’s not your ordinary pathogen you can just cook it out and be done with.
***> that’s what’s so worrisome about Iatrogenic mode of transmission, a simple autoclave will not kill this TSE prion agent.
1: J Neurol Neurosurg Psychiatry 1994 Jun;57(6):757-8
***> Transmission of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease to a chimpanzee by electrodes contaminated during neurosurgery.
Gibbs CJ Jr, Asher DM, Kobrine A, Amyx HL, Sulima MP, Gajdusek DC.
Laboratory of Central Nervous System Studies, National Institute of
Neurological Disorders and Stroke, National Institutes of Health,
Bethesda, MD 20892.
Stereotactic multicontact electrodes used to probe the cerebral cortex of a middle aged woman with progressive dementia were previously implicated in the accidental transmission of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) to two younger patients. The diagnoses of CJD have been confirmed for all three cases. More than two years after their last use in humans, after three cleanings and repeated sterilisation in ethanol and formaldehyde vapour, the electrodes were implanted in the cortex of a chimpanzee. Eighteen months later the animal became ill with CJD. This finding serves to re-emphasise the potential danger posed by reuse of instruments contaminated with the agents of spongiform encephalopathies, even after scrupulous attempts to clean them.
PMID: 8006664 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]
New studies on the heat resistance of hamster-adapted scrapie agent: Threshold survival after ashing at 600°C suggests an inorganic template of replication
Prion Infected Meat-and-Bone Meal Is Still Infectious after Biodiesel Production
MONDAY, APRIL 19, 2021
Evaluation of the application for new alternative biodiesel production process for rendered fat including Category 1 animal by-products (BDI-RepCat® process, AT) ???
Detection of protease-resistant cervid prion protein in water from a CWD-endemic area
A Quantitative Assessment of the Amount of Prion Diverted to Category 1 Materials and Wastewater During Processing
Rapid assessment of bovine spongiform encephalopathy prion inactivation by heat treatment in yellow grease produced in the industrial manufacturing process of meat and bone meals
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2019
BSE infectivity survives burial for five years with only limited spread
Paper
Rapid recontamination of a farm building occurs after attempted prion removal
Kevin Christopher Gough BSc (Hons), PhD Claire Alison Baker BSc (Hons) Steve Hawkins MIBiol Hugh Simmons BVSc, MRCVS, MBA, MA Timm Konold DrMedVet, PhD, MRCVS … See all authors
First published: 19 January 2019 https://doi.org/10.1136/vr.105054
The data illustrates the difficulty in decontaminating farm buildings from scrapie, and demonstrates the likely contribution of farm dust to the recontamination of these environments to levels that are capable of causing disease.
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This study clearly demonstrates the difficulty in removing scrapie infectivity from the farm environment. Practical and effective prion decontamination methods are still urgently required for decontamination of scrapie infectivity from farms that have had cases of scrapie and this is particularly relevant for scrapiepositive goatherds, which currently have limited genetic resistance to scrapie within commercial breeds.24 This is very likely to have parallels with control efforts for CWD in cervids.
***>This is very likely to have parallels with control efforts for CWD in cervids.
***> Infectious agent of sheep scrapie may persist in the environment for at least 16 years
***> Nine of these recurrences occurred 14–21 years after culling, apparently as the result of environmental contamination, but outside entry could not always be absolutely excluded.
JOURNAL OF GENERAL VIROLOGY Volume 87, Issue 12
Infectious agent of sheep scrapie may persist in the environment for at least 16 years Free
Gudmundur Georgsson1, Sigurdur Sigurdarson2, Paul Brown3
Front. Vet. Sci., 14 September 2015 | https://doi.org/10.3389/fvets.2015.00032
Objects in contact with classical scrapie sheep act as a reservoir for scrapie transmission
imageTimm Konold1*, imageStephen A. C. Hawkins2, imageLisa C. Thurston3, imageBen C. Maddison4, imageKevin C. Gough5, imageAnthony Duarte1 and imageHugh A. Simmons1
The findings of this study highlight the role of field furniture used by scrapie-infected sheep to act as a reservoir for disease re-introduction although infectivity declines considerably if the field furniture has not been in contact with scrapie-infected sheep for several months. PMCA may not be as sensitive as VRQ/VRQ sheep to test for environmental contamination.
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Discussion
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In conclusion, the results in the current study indicate that removal of furniture that had been in contact with scrapie-infected animals should be recommended, particularly since cleaning and decontamination may not effectively remove scrapie infectivity (31), even though infectivity declines considerably if the pasture and the field furniture have not been in contact with scrapie-infected sheep for several months. As sPMCA failed to detect PrPSc in furniture that was subjected to weathering, even though exposure led to infection in sheep, this method may not always be reliable in predicting the risk of scrapie infection through environmental contamination.
***> 172. Establishment of PrPCWD extraction and detection methods in the farm soil
Kyung Je Park, Hoo Chang Park, In Soon Roh, Hyo Jin Kim, Hae-Eun Kang and Hyun Joo Sohn
Foreign Animal Disease Division, Animal and Plant Quarantine Agency, Gimcheon, Gyeongsangbuk-do, Korea
Conclusions: Our studies showed that PrPCWD persist in 0.001% CWD contaminated soil for at least 4 year and natural CWD-affected farm soil. When cervid reintroduced into CWD outbreak farm, the strict decontamination procedures of the infectious agent should be performed in the environment of CWD-affected cervid habitat.
5 or 6 years quarantine is NOT LONG ENOUGH FOR CWD TSE PRION !!!
QUARANTINE NEEDS TO BE 21 YEARS FOR CWD TSE PRION !
FRIDAY, APRIL 30, 2021
Should Property Evaluations Contain Scrapie, CWD, TSE PRION Environmental Contamination of the land?
***> Confidential!!!!
***> As early as 1992-3 there had been long studies conducted on small pastures containing scrapie infected sheep at the sheep research station associated with the Neuropathogenesis Unit in Edinburgh, Scotland. Whether these are documented...I don't know. But personal recounts both heard and recorded in a daily journal indicate that leaving the pastures free and replacing the topsoil completely at least 2 feet of thickness each year for SEVEN years....and then when very clean (proven scrapie free) sheep were placed on these small pastures.... the new sheep also broke out with scrapie and passed it to offspring. I am not sure that TSE contaminated ground could ever be free of the agent!! A very frightening revelation!!!
---end personal email---end...tss
and so it seems...
Scrapie Agent (Strain 263K) Can Transmit Disease via the Oral Route after Persistence in Soil over Years
Published: May 9, 2007
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Our results showed that 263K scrapie agent can persist in soil at least over 29 months. Strikingly, not only the contaminated soil itself retained high levels of infectivity, as evidenced by oral administration to Syrian hamsters, but also feeding of aqueous soil extracts was able to induce disease in the reporter animals. We could also demonstrate that PrPSc in soil, extracted after 21 months, provides a catalytically active seed in the protein misfolding cyclic amplification (PMCA) reaction. PMCA opens therefore a perspective for considerably improving the detectability of prions in soil samples from the field.
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Dr. Paul Brown Scrapie Soil Test BSE Inquiry Document
Sensitive detection of chronic wasting disease prions recovered from environmentally relevant surfaces
Environment International
Available online 13 June 2022, 107347
Environment International
Sensitive detection of chronic wasting disease prions recovered from environmentally relevant surfaces
Qi Yuana Gag e Rowdenb Tiffany M.Wolfc Marc D.Schwabenlanderb Peter A.LarsenbShannon L.Bartelt-Huntd Jason C.Bartza
a Department of Medical Microbiology and Immunology, Creighton University, Omaha, Nebraska, 68178, United States of America
b Department of Veterinary and Biomedical Sciences, University of Minnesota, Saint Paul, MN, 55108, United States of America
c Department of Veterinary Population Medicine, University of Minnesota, Saint Paul, MN, 55108, United States of America
d Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Peter Kiewit Institute, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Omaha, Nebraska, 68182, United States of America
Received 26 April 2022, Revised 8 June 2022, Accepted 9 June 2022, Available online 13 June 2022.
Get rights and content
Under a Creative Commons license Open access
Highlights • An innovative method for prion recovery from swabs was developed.
• Recovery of prions decreased as swab-drying time was increased.
• Recovery of CWD prions from stainless steel and glass was approximately 30%.
• RT-QuIC enhanced CWD prion detection by 4 orders of magnitude.
• Surface-recovered CWD prion was sufficient for efficient RT-QuIC detection.
Abstract
Chronic wasting disease (CWD) has been identified in 30 states in the United States, four provinces in Canada, and recently emerged in Scandinavia. The association of CWD prions with environmental materials such as soil, plants, and surfaces may enhance the persistence of CWD prion infectivity in the environment exacerbating disease transmission. Identifying and quantifying CWD prions in the environment is significant for prion monitoring and disease transmission control. A systematic method for CWD prion quantification from associated environmental materials, however, does not exist. In this study, we developed an innovative method for extracting prions from swabs and recovering CWD prions swabbed from different types of surfaces including glass, stainless steel, and wood. We found that samples dried on swabs were unfavorable for prion extraction, with the greatest prion recovery from wet swabs. Using this swabbing technique, the recovery of CWD prions dried to glass or stainless steel was approximately 30% in most cases, whereas that from wood was undetectable by conventional prion immunodetection techniques. Real-time quake-induced conversion (RT-QuIC) analysis of these same samples resulted in an increase of the detection limit of CWD prions from stainless steel by 4 orders of magnitude. More importantly, the RT-QuIC detection of CWD prions recovered from stainless steel surfaces using this method was similar to the original CWD prion load applied to the surface. This combined surface swabbing and RT-QuIC detection method provides an ultrasensitive means for prion detection across many settings and applications.
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5. Conclusions
Chronic wasting disease is spreading in North America and it is hypothesized that in CWD-endemic areas environmental persistence of CWD prions can exacerbate disease transmission. The development of a sensitive CWD prion detection method from environmentally relevant surfaces is significant for monitoring, risk assessment, and control of CWD. In this study, we developed a novel swab-extraction procedure for field deployable sampling of CWD prions from stainless steel, glass, and wood. We found that extended swab-drying was unfavorable for extraction, indicating that hydrated storage of swabs after sampling aided in prion recovery. Recoverable CWD prions from stainless steel and glass was approximately 30%, which was greater than from wood. RT-QuIC analysis of the swab extracts resulted in an increase of the detection limit of CWD prions from stainless steel by 4 orders of magnitude compared to conventional immunodetection techniques. More importantly, the RT-QuIC detection of CWD prions recovered from stainless steel surfaces using this developed method was similar to the original CWD prion load without surface contact. This method of prion sampling and recovery, in combination with ultrasensitive detection methods, allows for prion detection from contaminated environmental surfaces.
Published: 06 September 2021
***> Chronic wasting disease: a cervid prion infection looming to spillover
Alicia Otero, Camilo Duque Velásquez, Judd Aiken & Debbie McKenzie
Veterinary Research volume 52, Article number: 115 (2021)
SUNDAY, MARCH 19, 2023
Use of Electronic Identification Eartags as Official Identification in Cattle and Bison APHIS-2021-0020-0001 Singeltary
SUNDAY, OCTOBER 16, 2022
USDA Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE Prion Action Plan National Program 103 Animal Health 2022-2027
Terry S. Singeltary Sr., Bacliff, Texas USA 77518 flounder9@verizon.net
